government in Laos that would include both pr<rAmerican elements and representatives from the communist Pathet Lao. The president's efforts faced stiff opposition, sometimes from within his own administration. Yet Kennedy continued to resist escalation and successfully obtained a negotiated settlement, even after a powerful communist offensive in May 1962. Although far from perfect, Kennedy's chosen course thwarted a communist takeover of Laos and provided relative stability for a troubled nation during dangerous times.
In examining Kennedy's foreign policy, scholars generally have treated the young president as a hard-line Cold Warrior, wedded to anticommunism and confrontation. 2 Those studying his Southeast Asian policies have echoed this assessment. Most historians have minimized his diplomatic accomplishments in Laos and insisted that the president simply intended to neutralize the situation there so that he could concentrate on aggressively thwarting communism in South Vietnam. 3 However, 2. For an historiographical discussion of Kennedy's foreign policy, see Burton I. Kaufman, ':John F. Kennedy as World Leader: A Perspective on the Literature," Diplomatic History, 17 (1993), 447-469. Kaufman characterizes the majority of scholars examining Kennedy as "still highly critical of the president." Among the general works disparaging Kennedy's foreign policies is Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961 (New York, 1989 . Robert Dean, "Masculinity as Ideology: John F. Kennedy and the Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy," Diplomatic History, 22 (1998), 29-62, recently has driven the criticism of Kennedy in a new direction by offering a gender-focused study of Kennedy's diplomacy, which Dean argues was shaped by "cultural narratives of imperial manhood." Dean offers, however, little in the way of primary research.
3. Among the more prominent studies arguing that Kennedy's accommodation in Laos paradoxically dictated a harder line in Vietnam are George MeT. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, Md., 1986), 91, see few benefits that accrued from Kennedy's neutralization plan and argue that neu-while certainly a Cold Warrior, Kennedy exhibited his own brand of flexible, personal diplomacy in pursuit of his larger agenda. Mter an early attempt to address the Laotian crisis through counterinsurgency, he turned to diplomacy in April 1961. He assigned toW. Averell Harriman the delicate job of forming a reliable neutral government through an international conference at Geneva, Switzerland, but he continued to oversee the negotiations closely. Harriman's creative and often forceful diplomacy was the key to the successes achieved in Laos. Nevertheless, Kennedy remained in command; on at least two occasions, he overruled the calls of Harriman and other advisers to utilize American military forces in Laos to shore up diplomatic efforts.
Operating against heavy odds, Harriman worked a series of near-miracles at Geneva. These included maintaining a cease-fire, eliciting Soviet support for Laotian neutrality, and persuading the American-supported, anticommunist royal government of Laos to cooperate. Under Harriman's guidance, and with Soviet support (apparently inspired by fears of Chinese competition in Southeast Asia), Laos by mid-1962 had a functioning, neutral government, giving rise to hopes of expanding the Laotian blueprint for neutrality to all of Southeast Asia. Members of Kennedy's own administration strongly advocated such a policy, and the president was sympathetic.
Yet, in the long run, the intricacies of the Southeast Asian political situation proved overwhelming, and the moment slipped away. The Laotian model was too complex and politically risky. Neither the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC), nor the United States fully controlled its allies in the region, yet each insisted on retaining a fa<;ade of control. As a result, despite the positive spirit engendered at Geneva and the successful effort to neutralize Laos, Southeast Asia, by the end of the decade, had become the center of Cold War tensions. Nevertheless, Kennedy's venture into the politics of actrality allowed for further infiltration by the Viet Cong through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. William J. Duiker By 1961, three main players, covering a broad political spectrum, had emerged on the Laotian scene: Phoumi on the far-right; Souvanna, the neutralist, slightly to the left of center; and, on the far left, Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet Lao.7 In addition, there were four outside players: the United States, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and the People's Republic of China. Buoyed by an immense Soviet airlift of supplies to northern Laos, the Pathet Lao were on the march early in 1961, winning a series of encounters that brought them to the verge of taking all of Laos. As President Eisenhower prepared to step down from office, he grimly informed Kennedy that he must be prepared to intervene militarily in Laos. Eisenhower added that defeat in Laos would mean losing the "cork in the bottle." As such, the effect would be the "beginning of the loss of most of East Asia." 8 Kennedy had been elected on the basis of his promise to get the United States moving again, both domestically and internationally. Campaigning in 1960, he had attacked the Eisenhower administration's failure to challenge explicitly com-7. The issue of Laotian "nationhood" deserves much deeper treatment than can be provided here. A landlocked country of roughly three million in the early 1960s, with an impoverished, agrarian economy, Laos was a maze of religious, ethnic, political, regional, and family divisions. The Lao people make up roughly one half of the population, while several other ethnic groups, including the Hmong, constitute the rest of the population. Given the complex of vying interests in Laos and its colonial background, little in the way of any real "nationalist" sentiment existed. Thus, it is all the more remarkable that Souvanna Phouma managed to bridge some of the gulfs in Laotian society and establish a sense of legitimacy in the eyes of his countrymen. In regard to the Pathet Lao, see MacAlister Brown and Joseph Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930 -1985 (Stanford, Calif., 1986 , 70-86, for a general treatment of the Pathet Lao during the neutralization process. Brown and Zasloff depict the Pathet Lao as a "joint enterprise" with the North Vietnamese.
8. "Memorandum for the Record," Jan. coercive efforts in Laos, the president adamantly avoided further overt military actions. Clearly, the events of early 1961 had an impact on the young president. In April, he told former vice president Richard Nixon, "I don't see how we can make any move in Laos which is 5000 miles away if we don't make a move in Cuba which is 90 miles away." 18 While never fully abandoning his interest in counterinsurgency, especially along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Kennedy clearly had lost faith in the abilities of either the Laotian or American military forces to shape events in Laos.
The Circumstances thus clearly favored negotiation rather than a military solution in Laos. Although he still had the alternative of committing U.S. troops to Laos-an option favored by many of his advisers-Kennedy now was reluctant to pursue a military course. Politically, negotiations held some promise. Kennedy had inherited a deteriorating situation from Eisenhower. The previous administration, he could argue, had let the opportunity to challenge the Pathet Lao slip away. Through careful diplomacy, Kennedy could lure the significant neutral forces loyal to Souvanna away from their alliance with the Pathet Lao and continue to pursue covert operations along the eastern border of Laos. This would represent an improvement over the conditions in Laos at the time of Kennedy's inauguration. A cease-fire leading to an international conference would also buy time. Should the Pathet Lao violate the cease-fire, Kennedy would then have international support for U.S. intervention. Neutralizing Laos would allow Kennedy to concentrate on Western Europe and Berlin-his real priorities.
Yet Kennedy's strategy brought with it political risk. At home, key congressional leaders of both parties warned the president against any capitulation to the communists. 2 2 Although he urged the president to pursue negotiations, Prime Minister Macmillan recognized that Kennedy faced a difficult dilemma. In April he reported to a British cabinet meeting that Kennedy would be called "an appeaser" if Laos fell to the communists, but if war resulted, Kennedy, like President Harry Truman in Korea, would be a "warmonger."2 3
Nevertheless, Kennedy pushed on with negotiations. He assigned Harriman to lead the American delegation to Geneva. The two men remained in close contact, with Kennedy often 24 In order to begin the conference, a cease-fire was necessary. Both Harriman and General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, urged Kennedy to use a small contingent of American troops in Laos to enforce the cease-fire. Consistent with his policy throughout, however, Kennedy firmly resisted the introduction of American troops to shore up the truce. 25 The opening of the conference had to be postponed several days, but a provisional cease-fire allowed it to begin on Mayl7, 1961.
24. W. Averell Harriman, oral history interview by Larry Hackman (Boston, 1970), 34-35, JFK Library; Harriman interview by Schlesinger, 73, 84. Mter initial reservations about the new president, Harriman became increasingly impressed by Kennedy's "ability to penetrate to the heart of every problem and to sift through conflicting advice:' Brown oral history interview, 16; Parsons oral history interview, 31. Parsons also later remarked on Kennedy's unique style of diplomacy, referring to the "president's personal involvement, even to the point of picking up the telephone and calling officers of no great prominence for something that he wanted to know and know then. The conference opened amid low expectations. In a memorandum to President Kennedy, Harriman expressed little hope for the talks; he suggested that a walkout might be necessary if things went poorly. An American contingency plan, involving a "de facto division" of Laos, was prepared in case the conference failed. The plan proposed to leave the north to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, while the south would remain a haven for the American-supported rightists. At the same time, Harriman made clear to Kennedy that such an arrangement would require Americans to make "the ultimate decision": to use American troops to defend the south. Harriman was so pessimistic that he recommended that Laotian royal troops continue to train during the cease-fire "to support this eventuality." 26 As the conference opened, Harriman and Kennedy's primary concern was to gain concrete assurances of Soviet cooperation. Without a firm Soviet commitment to stop supplying the guerrillas and to persuade the North Vietnamese to halt their efforts, nothing could be accomplished. In spite of positive signals from the Kremlin, Soviet representatives at Geneva apparently had no official authorization to support neutralization.27 In early June Kennedy and Khrushchev were to meet in Vienna. The meeting, Kennedy decided, would be the perfect occasion to press the Soviets for a definite commitment on the question of Laos.
The Vienna summit proved to be an extraordinarily tense meeting. When Kennedy first brought up the topic of Laos, Khrushchev rebuffed him, saying that he was well aware of the part played by the United States in overthrowing Souvanna. In response, Kennedy admitted that American actions had not always been "wise," but then, sensing inflexibility, he shifted to other subjects. The next morning Kennedy again steered the conversation toward Laos and this time found Khrushchev in a more conciliatory mood. The Soviet chairman agreed to work in good faith for the Geneva goals and observed that interested parties "should be locked in a room and told to find a solution:' The agreement on Laos was, in fact, the only positive note of the Vienna summit.28
Thus, even as the Cold War appeared to intensify, the two superpowers were working together to resolve conflict in Laos. But why would the Soviets, after their massive airlift to support the Pathet Lao, agree to such cooperation? American and western delegates could only speculate on the matter. Some, such as Under-Secretary of State Chester Bowles, suspected that it was an early sign of a Sino-Soviet break, evidence that the Soviets feared a Southeast Asia controlled by China. 29 Their expensive airlift to the Pathet Lao was perhaps an effort to supplant Chinese influence. To the Soviets, the option of a strong neutral government in Laos, and perhaps a series of other neutral governments across Southeast Asia, might be a welcome alternative to an enlarged Chinese sphere of influence. In retrospect, this analysis rings true, but it was hardly clear at the time. With the Chinese still very hostile-in fact, not speaking to the Americans-there was little hope that the United States could take advantage of a split even if one became more evident. 30 
It would seem to be more sensible to sit back and let the other fellow break the agreement and then pretend that they had nothing to do with it." 33 Whatever the Russian motives may have been, the American-Soviet exchanges at Vienna and Geneva significantly raised hopes for a successful negotiated settlement. A few days after the Vienna summit closed, Souvanna, his communist halfbrother Souphanouvong, and Prince Bon Oum, the head of the royal government, held a preliminary meeting in Geneva. This was a step forward, but the Americans continued to want a better sense of Souvanna, a figure still allied with the Laotian communists.
Before the three princes met, Harriman arranged to have a comprehensive conference with Souvanna. The ambassador used the meeting to pepper the prince with questions. Pointing to his royal background and close ties to France, including his French wife, Souvanna assured Harriman that he was no communist. The prince declared that he was ready to take the leadership of Laos and asked for American assistance. Harriman hedged, saying that Souvanna was asking him "to believe too supporting the south with ground troops. For similar conclusions, see Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "Two Scorpions in a Cup: America and the Soviet Airlift to Laos," Aerospace History, 27 (1980) appraisals and making "it very plain that he himself [was] at the present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos." Kennedy urged that the Geneva negotiations be carried forth in good faith, adding that "nothing would be worse than an unsuccessful intervention in this area." 38 In early September, a disturbing telegram from Brown suddenly diverted Harriman from the tasks at hand. The ambassador had asked General Phoumi, the military leader of the royal forces, about rumors of Nationalist Chinese (Taiwanese) military units fighting the Pathet Lao in northern Laos. To Brown's shock, Phoumi confirmed that three companies of Nationalist troops were indeed in Laos. The communist Chinese had long complained that Thai and Taiwanese troops were aiding the royal government. The United States had always vigorously denied the charges. Should the revelations about the troops from Taiwan become public, Harriman's accusations about North Vietnamese interference in Laos would appear hypocritical. In addition, the Nationalist Chinese might draw the People's Republic of China directly into the Laotian conflict. Harriman fired off an immediate response: "Urge in strongest terms that these units be disbanded and officers returned, if possible, to Taiwan." Within two days the royal government agreed to withdraw the "irregulars;· defusing the potentially explosive situation. 39 Harriman's next move came at a mid-September meeting with Souvanna in Rangoon, Burma, where he sought to spell out exactly what he expected of Souvanna. Over several meetings, Souvanna reiterated his distrust of the communists and even went so far as to concede that it might be necessary to fight the Pathet Lao. Yet Souvanna remained too confident for Harriman's taste about the prospects for a neutral government. At the end of the meeting, despite his sense that the prince was "overly-optimistic" and "unrealistic" on several issues, Harriman participate in the neutral government. In September 1961 both Brown and John Kenneth Galbraith, ambassador to India, reported that Phoumi had expressed discomfort with the idea of a government headed up by Souvanna. Galbraith worried that Phoumi would purposely break the cease-fire and retreat to the south, expecting American support. 4 8 In November 1961 fighting broke out near Xieng Khay, the Laotian communist stronghold. American officials feared that Galbraith's scenario was unfolding. Responsibility for breaking the cease-fire could not be pinned on either party; nevertheless, a cloud of suspicion hung over Phoumi and the United States. Harriman reported to the State Department that opinion at the conference had turned against the United States as a result of the violation of the cease-fire. The fighting at Xieng Khay stopped after a few days, but Harriman's suspicion of Phoumi's intentions remained. 49 Of course, Harriman was well aware of Phoumi's ability to subvert the Geneva negotiations. The general had a reputation as an ineffective military officer and a corrupt administrator of American aid. But Phoumi had supporters within both the American government and public. Columnist Joseph Alsop, for instance, considered the general a friend and a dependable ally for the United States. Alsop publicly praised Phoumi and derided the Geneva conference as an "exercise in international hypocrisy." 5° Harriman, however, saw Phoumi as an obstacle requiring immediate and forceful attention. 5 1 In late January 1962 the key parties to the Laotian agreement again prepared to meet in Geneva to arrange concrete plans for the composition of the coalition cabinet. Harriman feared that Phoumi would hold up the meeting by demanding the ministry of defense for himself, knowing full well that this would compromise the neutralization plan.
To force Phoumi's cooperation, Harriman made an extraordinary move. He decided to threaten Phoumi with a cutoff of American aid and to ask the Soviets not to take advantage of the temporary weakness of the royal Laotian forces. On January 15, 1962, Harriman met with Pushkin and told his counterpart that, if necessary, the Americans would "expect his assistance" in obtaining Pathet Lao assurances not to take advantage of the situation. Pushkin agreed. Harriman's admission of the complications of handling supposed allies was an unprecedented event in the Cold War, where fa~ades of control often shrouded the struggles of both superpowers to keep recalcitrant allies under some degree of command. 52 Even with the threat of no U.S. aid, Phoumi stood fast. The princes lingered in Geneva several days waiting for Phoumi to signal his willingness to resume negotiations. In a further effort to press Phoumi, an American, British, Canadian, and French task force met to consider "ostentatiously cultivating" a right-wing political rival of Phoumi in order to scare the general into compliance. 5 3 The three princes finally met on January 19, 1962, but their conference went "nowhere." In a "black mood," Pushkin predicted the breakup of the entire conference and the renewal of hostilities. 54 The following day, however, the princes, under pressure from all sides, surprised everyone and worked out a provisional accord. They endorsed all of the international agreements made at Geneva and decided to put off the final decision of who would serve as defense minister. Significantly, Phoumi did indicate a willingness to take another ministry post in place of defense. 5 5 Superpower cooperation occurred infrequently in the Cold War, and both Pushkin and Harriman seemed to recognize its rarity. Mter the breakthrough meeting among the princes, Harriman privately told Pushkin that he had grown to appreciate "the frankness with which we had come to speak with each other" and added that this "was more than with any other Soviet in my experience." Pushkin returned the compliment, saying that their cooperation was "an example of how the USSR and the US could work out immediate problems and conflicts in mutual interest."56
In spite of their optimism, it soon became clear that General Phoumi was still not cooperating. Returning to Laos from Geneva, he let it be known that he intended to remain head of the military. Growing increasingly concerned, Harriman decided to apply direct pressure. He arranged to suspend the $3 million per month American grant to Phoumi and to have Laos-based CIA agent John Hasey sent home. Hasey was a close friend of Phoumi, and Harriman suspected that he was subverting the peace efforts. Ambassador Brown, insisting that Hasey was loyal, disagreed with Harriman, but he supported Hasey's removal as another effort to pressure Phoumi. 5 7 Kennedy then sent Phoumi a personal message urging him to cooperate and making it clear that Harriman's words--and not those of anyone else-represented the president's views. 5 8 Harriman also decided to go to Laos for a direct confrontation with Phoumi. To pressure the general, Harriman brought with him Phoumi's cousin, Marshal Sarit Thanarat, Thailand's dictator. Kennedy tapped Admiral Harry D. Felt, commander-in-chief of armed forces in the Pacific, to secure Sarit's help. In return for his support, Felt apparently promised Sarit some form of U.S. protection in the future. By the time that Harriman arrived in Southeast Asia in late March, the Thais had joined the Americans in issuing a joint communique in favor of Laotian neutrality. 59
Upon arrival, Harriman ventured just over the Laotian border to the Thai town of Nong Khai. There Harriman met with Sarit, Phoumi, and Kenneth Young, the U.S. ambassador to Thailand. Phoumi began by insisting that Souvanna could not be trusted and repeating his reluctance to give up the de- hold over their Laotian allies, the ambassador explained, was even more tenuous, with the communist Chinese standing by as an alternate means of support. Compared to the United States and its relationship with Phoumi, the Soviet Union had much less leverage. In the end, Thompson suspected, the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese had acted on their own. 69 The presence of American troops in Thailand and the continuing support for a neutral Laos by all principal parties brought a return to cease-fire conditions by the end of May. On June 11, 1962, Souvanna announced the final arrangements for the coalition government-with Souvanna as prime minister and Phoumi and Souphanouvong as vice premiers. With Laotian neutrality on the verge of reality, the Geneva conference assembled for its final sessions at the beginning of July. The opening day mood was one of elation, almost a "class reunion" atmosphere. The delegates addressed the final details, and, on July 23, fourteen nations signed the final accords, requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos within seventy-five days. 70 Optimism spread across Southeast Asia and Washington as the conference wrapped up successfully. 71 In the aftermath of Geneva, encouraged by the ability of the United States to work with the Soviets in promoting neutrality for Laos, a group within the Kennedy administration began to press for an extension of the neutrality model to other Southeast Asian countries. Early on, Kennedy's interest in Laotian neutrality and the apparent Soviet cooperation in this venture encouraged a rethinking of American policy. In May 1961 Kenneth Young, U.S. ambassador to Thailand, wrote a memorandum suggesting that Laos might serve as "a catalyst changing the composition of our 69. Llewellyn Thompson to Rusk, May 15, 1962, box 529, ibid. 70. "U.S. Delegation in Geneva to Rusk," July 2, 1962, box 529, ibid. Along with requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the Geneva accords contained a declaration of neutrality in which all signatories agreed to respect Laotian neutrality fully. The signed agreement also carried provisions against military alliances with Laos or the presence of any foreign military troops on Laotian soil.
71. According to a Department of Defense history, the signing of the Geneva accords created a "euphoria and optimism" that led McNamara to set in motion a planned withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam. Pentagon Papers, 2: 160-162.
policy." 7 2 Christian Chapman, a desk officer at the American embassy in Vientiane, launched a proposal to create a neutral barrier of countries to the south of communist China. 73 Higher officials at the State Department shared Chapman's views. In the fall of 1961, after Harriman had procured preliminary understandings with both Souvanna and the Soviets, Under-Secretary of State Bowles, prophetically warning that American military involvement in the area could result in a "humiliating defeat," issued a sweeping proposal. He called for the formation of an "independent belt" in Southeast Asia that would include Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Malaya. 74 Encouraged by the successful completion of the Geneva conference, Bowles pressed his plan. He proposed releasing a grand presidential "Peace Charter for Southeast Asia" that he personally would carry to Southeast Asia and launch. The Bowles proposal had supporters within the State Department, including Roger Hilsman, director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, and his deputy Thomas Hughes. Hilsman later called the Bowles proposal "imaginative" and claimed that President Kennedy was sympathetic: "my sense of his attitude is that he accepted the concept as a farseeing expression of the ultimate goal for Southeast Asia." 75 During the final days of the Geneva conference, Kennedy, through Harriman, appeared to be exploring the possibility of expanding the Geneva accords. On the day before the conference ended, Harriman and his aide, William H. Sullivan, met directly with Ung Van Kiem, the North Vietnamese foreign minister. In the official record of the meeting, Harriman noted an "improvement in candor" on the part of the North Vietnamese, which included an admission of sorts that their troops were operating in Laos. Political scientist Allan E. Goodman has suggested that Harriman also proposed the idea of neutralizing Vietnam along the lines of the just-completed Laotian model. The North Vietnamese, however, quickly insisted that, as a precondition for any negotiations, the United States must immediately Withdraw all support personnel from South Vietnam. This was unacceptable to the Americans, and the meeting ended with no progress. 76 The following day, Harriman scheduled a formal talk with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Li, in spite of some resistance from the State Department. At the meeting, Harriman hinted to Chen Li that the United States might be interested in easing tensions between the two nations, but the Chinese insisted that no movement could take place until the United States turned Taiwan over to the People's Republic of China. There the conversation ended. 77 The North Vietnamese and Chinese reactions, it would appear, thwarted any further thoughts of neutralizing all of Southeast Asia. Upon Harriman's return to the United States, Secretary of State Rusk asked him to review Bowles's proposal. According to Bowles, Harriman had been an enthusiastic sup-porter of his neutralization plan. 78 But in his response to Rusk, Harriman assailed the plan as unworkable and "impractical." The logistics of organizing conferences and procuring international and regional support would be nearly impossible. 'More importantly, Harriman argued, the communists simply could not be trusted. 79 The possibility of furthering the working relationship between the United States and Soviet Union established at Geneva also evaporated quickly. Pushkin died within a year of the Geneva agreement. When Harriman went to the Kremlin in 1963 to press Khrushchev to keep his side of the bargain on Laos, the Soviet premier virtually refused to talk about the issue, perhaps out of embarrassment that the Soviet Union could not control the Pathet Lao. so
Prospects for a Southeast Asian detente were thus shortlived. The Soviet pretense of controlling the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese quickly crumbled. 81 In spite of Soviet guarantees and the Geneva agreement, North Vietnam continued to make free use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Aided by the North Vietnamese, the Pathet Lao resumed their guerrilla war after the Geneva agreements. The U.S. military continued to formulate contingency plans involving American troops in case the coalition government failed.
The agreements at Geneva should not be seen, however, as a failure. While Souvanna increasingly relied upon the United States, he still retained a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the Laotian populace. 8 2 The addition of Souvanna and the substantial neutralist forces to the remnants of the royal army was enough to hold off the communists in key regions of Laos. 83 This provided the United States with a staging ground for its "secret war" against the North Vietnamese (clandestine campaigns that were in clear violation of the Geneva agreements). Serving as ambassador to Laos beginning in 1964, Sullivan recalled the CIA-trained Hmong warriors as having significant success as part of the "secret war" fighting the North Vietnamese in northern regions of Laos. 84 Two years after the formation of the coalition government in Laos, Harriman wrote with some satisfaction that the U.S. position in Laos _"is substantially better than it was two years ago. We have lost practically no territory .... We are now supporting the neutralists and the conservatives whereas before we were in the intolerable position of supporting only the right wing." Harriman also credited neutralization with having "held the Mekong Valley from Viet-Cong control, and to a considerable extent protected Thailand from the subversive incursion that we were gravely concerned would make Thailand another guerrilla battlefield."85 Thus, while hardly an unqualified success, Kennedy's pursuit of neutrality left the United States with a measure of influence in Laos and was certainly preferable to By the end of his life, Kennedy was moving away from any idea of expanding neutrality to all of Southeast Asia. 86 Nonetheless, his dogged pursuit of a coalition government in Laos provides valuable insights into the nature of Kennedy's diplomatic style, especially in relation to the question of Vietnam.
Some have suggested that Kennedy was interested in pacifYing Laos mainly so that he could focus all his attention on waging an active war against communism in Vietnam. 87 Kennedy's experience in Laos, however, taught him the value of risk and compromise. Kennedy initiated negotiations, pressed Khrushchev for support at Vienna, and stuck to negotiations, over even Harriman's reservations. Kennedy refused to use American troops in Laos and in doing so defied virtually all of his advisers. In his support for Souvanna, Kennedy showed an understanding of the importance of finding leaders with popular legitimacy. Kennedy also showed a willingness to seek information and conduct policy in an unorthodox manner by contacting and dealing directly with ambassadors such as Harriman and Brown, and by circumventing the State Department, where entrenched interests, such as those at the International Security Mfairs office, threatened to thwart his intentions. Finally, Kennedy was prepared to use neutrality as a diplomatic and political tool to the end of providing delays, realignments, face-saving devices, and fac;;ades for other efforts. At the very least, Kennedy learned that he could ease political pressure through creative diplomacy. Whatever path Kennedy would have chosen for Southeast Asian policy after 1963 will forever remain a mystery. One can only surmise that future decisions would have been shaped by the in-86. "Memorandum of Conversation," Sept. 23, 1963 , Foreign Relations, 1961 1053. In a meeting with Souvannain the fall of 1963, Kennedy told the Laotian prime minister that, while he was open to neutralizing Vietnam, the "necessary ingredients seemed to be lacking," such as a figure like Souvanna who could unite the country.
87. Sullivan oral history interview, 34.
